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IN T R O D U C T I O N
The motor vehicle-train accident, though infrequent, is the most
severe in terms of fatalities, personal injuries, and property damage per
accident of all types experienced on American highways. This type of
accident, however, can be eliminated only by closing all crossings to
highway traffic or by constructing grade separations for all rail-highway
crossings. The delay and congestion resulting from the first alternative
obviously would not be tolerated by the motoring public. Based on an
estimated cost of separation improvements in Ohio, it would cost $5
billion to construct grade separations at the 10,800 grade crossings in
Indiana. ( 4 ) *
Another alternative is to install modern flashing lights with
short-arm gates at all crossings. Such an undertaking is estimated to
reduce the number of accidents by a considerable amount, but the
cost would be in excess of $150 million. (4 ) This figure is more realistic
but still represents an enormous sum of money. Furthermore, the
expenditure of this amount of money might well be more efficiently
used for the prevention of other types of accidents.
The national trend for rail-highway grade crossing accidents is
decreasing, but the reverse is true in Indiana. Based on data compiled
by the Interstate Commerce Commission at the close of 1953, the
numbers of grade crossing accidents and fatalities in Indiana were
among the highest in the nation. Indiana was exceeded only by
Arkansas in grade crossing accidents per million cars registered and
grade crossing deaths per million cars registered. (4 )
* Numbers in parentheses refer to sources listed in the bibliography.
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During 1962 and 1963, 149 people were killed in motor vehicletrain accidents in Indiana. This figure accounts for 6.0 percent of the
total highway fatalities but only 0.4 percent of the total number of
accidents. ( 1 ) The severity of these accidents is of general concern
to the public and is invariably well publicized.
The present warrants as specified by the Indiana State Highway
Commission for the protection of highway-rail grade crossings are
as follows:
a) “ T w o or more main line tracks should be protected by flashing
lights and short-arm gates;
b) Where train speeds are 70 mph or greater on single line tracks,
flashing lights and short-arm gates should be used; and
c) A ll other crossings are protected by flashing lights except those
where there is good sight distance in all quadrants and where
either the highway traffic is less than 500 vehicles per day
( A D T ) , or rail traffic less than 6 trains per day ( T P D ) . These
latter crossings are protected by reflectorized crossbucks and
advance warning signs.” (3 )
These general warrants do not result in priority ratings based on hazard.
The priority for improving crossing protection at rail-highway inter
sections is left to subjective judgment.
In a recent report by the Interstate Commerce Commission based on
data submitted by the railroads, Henry Vinskey concluded that the
major cause of rail-highway grade crossing accidents is the failure of
motor-vehicle drivers to yield to trains. (2 ) The purpose of this
research study was to investigate existing conditions which might have
encouraged drivers not to take reasonable precautions. This study con
stitutes an analysis of highway-rail grade crossing accidents with respect
to the effects of environment, crossing geometry, highway and rail traffic
patterns, existing protective devices, and other relevant elements and
their relative importance as a basis for determining a more effective
and economic means of establishing the necessary railroad crossing
protection. (5 )
PROCEDU RE
Because accident data were readily available for only two years,
1962 and 1963, and so that more meaningful correlations could be
developed, accident locations were compared to nonaccident locations.
The 289 accident locations, which included most of the rural crossings
in Indiana with at least one accident in 1962 and 1963, were estab
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lished by using the traffic accident reports of the Indiana State Police.
The 241 nonaccident locations were randomly selected throughout
the state in proportion to the railroad mileage in each county.
The information for the study variables came primarily from three
separate sources: police accident reports; field investigations; and rail
road correspondence. A total of 28 variables was considered in evaluat
ing the effects of environment, topography, geometry, and highway
and railroad traffic patterns on the safety of rail-highway grade crossings
in rural areas. Only those variables which significantly influenced the
hazard of grade crossings are presented in the Results section.
Multiple linear regression analysis was performed on the 28 varia
bles common to both accident and nonaccident locations. The dependent
variable was accident occurrence, a dichotomous variable representing
occurrence or non-occurrence of an accident. The “ buildup” regression
routine allowed the ordering of the independent variables to permit
•the initial inclusion of preselected variables. For all equations, train
and highway traffic volumes were ordered to permit their inclusion in
the multiple regression expressions.
R E SU L TS
In an attempt to gain an insight into the characteristics of railroad
highway grade crossing accidents, the following statistical summary
was developed from the accident locations analyzed in this research
investigation.
1. Driver characteristics.
a. Driver age— the average age of all drivers involved in a
grade crossing accident was 36 years.
b. Driver sex— 8 6 percent of these drivers were male.
c. Driver residence— 72 percent of the drivers were from the
county in which the accident occurred. Ninety-four percent
of the drivers were residents of Indiana.
d. Number of occupants— the average number of occupants in
accident vehicles was 1.36 persons per vehicle.
e. Drinking driver— only 6 percent of the accident reports indi
cated that the driver had been drinking.
f.

Personal injury— 62 percent of the accidents resulted in at
least one personal injury.

g. Fatality— 14 percent of the accidents resulted in at least one
fatality.
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2. Vehicle characteristics.
a. Vehicle type— 27 percent of the accident vehicles were trucks.
b. Age of vehicle— the average age of vehicle involved in grade
crossing accidents was 5.2 years.
c. Vehicle defects— 17 percent of the accident vehicles evidenced
contributing mechanical defects.
d. W indow position— 71 percent of the vehicles were considered
to have had their windows rolled up at the time of the
accident.
e. Actual car speed— the average of the reported car speeds of
vehicles involved in accidents was 24 mph.
f.

Actual train speed— the average of the reported speeds of
trains involved in accidents was 41 mph.

3. Environmental characteristics.
a. Clear weather— 74 percent of the accidents occurred during’
clear weather.
b. Darkness— 36 percent of the accidents occurred at night.
c. Pavement surface moisture— pavements were dry 57 percent,
wet 16 percent, and had ice or snow 27 percent of the time
that accidents occurred.
d. Day of the week— accident occurrence by day of the week is
summarized below:
Monday
Tuesday
Wednesday
Thursday
Friday
Saturday
Sunday

14.2%
14.5%
11.8%
15.6%
16.3%
15.6%
11.8%

An equation was developed to account for the various protection
devices, train and highway volumes and those additional variables which
significantly influenced accident occurrence. This analysis produced the
following prediction equation:
1.

IH = + 0.149 — 0.376X 29 — 0.300X 3O — 0.383X 3i
— 0.331X32 +
+ 0.0142X55 +
where IH = index of
X 29 = presence
X 30 = presence

0.082X4O +

0.0223X4i +

0.011X 54

0.024X57
hazard (accident occurrence),
of a painted crossbuck (0, 1),
of a reflectorized crossbuck ( 0 , 1 ),
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X 3i =
X 32 =
X 40 =
X 41 =
X 54 =
X 55 =
X 57 =

presence of a flasher ( 0 , 1 ),
presence of a gate ( 0 , 1 ),
number of track pairs,
pavement width in feet,
TPD,
A D T /1 0 0 0 , and
sum of distractions.

In addition to the protection variables, Equation 1 also includes
variables which are measures of train and highway volumes. The type of
rail and highway operations is represented by the variables designated
as number of track pairs and pavement width. The number of roadside
distractions which is the sum of the houses, businesses, and advertising
signs per one-half mile on both sides of the roadway for one approach
to the crossing, proved significant in this equation. The coefficient of
determination for Equation 1 was 19.3 percent.
The regression coefficients of the four protective devices were
remarkably similar. It might be inferred from, this fact that hazard was
relatively independent of the type of protective device. T o ascertain
the statistical significance of the coefficients for the protection variables,
a second multiple regression equation was developed which excluded
the four types of crossing protection and included the remaining varia
bles. The coefficient of determination for Equation 2, presented below,
was 18.3 percent.
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where IH =
X 40 =
X 41 =
X 54 •=
X 55 =
X 57 =

index of hazard,
number of track pairs,
pavement width in feet,
TPD,
A D T /1 0 0 0 , and
sum of distractions.

An F-test was performed on the multiple coefficients of determina
tion for Equations 1 and 2 to test the hypothesis that the regression
coefficients for the four protective devices as presented in Equation 2
were not significantly different from zero. This hypothesis was not
rejected at the 5-percent level of significance.
This analysis did not show that protection devices had a significant
influence on the prediction of hazard at grade crossings. Although the
protection device variables can be eliminated from the prediction equa
tion, the result of this significance test does not warrant the conclusion
that protection devices have no influence on reducing hazard. This
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finding is restricted by the limited variability of the field conditions for
the four types of protection investigated. As an example, all high-volume
roads were generally protected with flashers or gates, and all low-volume
roads were protected primarily with crossbucks. Perhaps a before-andafter study at locations where changes in protection devices are made
is necessary for such evaluation.
Because the inclusion of the protection variables did not materially
improve the estimation of hazard and because the types of protection
device were equally weighted, the nomograph shown as Figure 1 was
developed from Equation 2. In an attempt to correlate the index of
hazard with the present standards of installing protection devices at
grade crossings in Indiana, the mean indices of hazard were calculated
for the study crossings protected with reflectorized crossbucks, flashers,
and gates. These mean values were, respectively, 0.523, 0.774, and
0.828. A suggested warrant for the selection of at-grade protection was
determined by computing the average value between the mean index
of hazard for the various protection devices. Flashers would be war
ranted if the index of hazard is greater than 0.65, and gates would be
recommended for indices greater than 0.80. The values suggested for
these warrants are based on current levels of protection. Painted
crossbucks were not included in the nomograph because all crossbucks
are required to be reflectorized by State law. Although many painted
crossbucks are presently in service, these devices are to be replaced
with reflectorized crossbucks when necessary.
The index of hazard and minimum protection warranted for the
example shown on Figure 1 is determined in the following manner;
Given: T P D = 6 ; A D T = 4000; 2 track pairs; 20-ft pavement
width; and 1 0 roadside distractions.
1. Draw a line extending from 6 trains per day through 4/1000
A D T to turning line A.
2. From the intersection point on line A, a line is drawn through
2 track pairs and extended to turning line B.
3. From this point of intersection, a line is drawn through 20-ft
pavement width and extended until it intersects turning line C.
4. After connecting this point on line C to the 10 roadside distrac
tions, the index of hazard and minimum type of protection war
ranted is found at the intersection of this line with the index
of hazard scale.
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Fig. 1.

Protection nomograph,
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C O N C L U S IO N S
The following conclusions concerning hazard at railroad-highway
grade crossings summarize the findings of this research investigation.
As actual accident locations were compared to a random sample of
non-accident locations, these results can reasonably be applied to all
rural grade crossings within the State of Indiana.
1.

The accident victims are predominantly young male drivers
residing in the county in which the accident occurred. They
are usually traveling alone and not under the influence of
alcohol. More than one half of them are injured, and about
one out of seven is killed.

2. Trucks account for more than one quarter of the accident
vehicles. Seventeen percent of all vehicles involved in accidents
have evidence of mechanical defects. The possibility of the
driver hearing a warning bell or train whistle is reduced because
the windows are closed on most vehicles. The majority of
accidents occur at relatively low car speeds and at moderate
train speeds.
3.

Most accidents occur during the favorable driving conditions of
clear weather, daylight hours, and dry pavements. However, the
number of accidents per unit time and per unit exposure is
probably greater for ice and snow conditions and for wet pave
ments than for dry pavement conditions.

4. The type of protection is not important as a variable in the
equations developed by regression analysis for the prediction of
index of hazard.
5. The regression equation developed by the multiple linear regres
sion technique (Equation 2) identifies number of track pairs,
highway pavement width, train volume, average daily traffic
volume, and the sum of distractions (number of houses, busi
nesses, and advertising signs) as important variables for the
prediction of index of hazard. This equation explains 18 percent
of the variation in accident occurrence.
6.

Warrants for the installation of protective devices at rail
highway crossings, based on the current standard of protection
used in Indiana, are hazard indices of below 0.65 for reflectorized
crossbucks, 0.65 to 0.80 for flashers, and above 0.80 for gates.

7. This investigation of many roadway, railroad, traffic, and en
vironmental variables permitted only an explanation of ap
proximately 20 percent of accident occurrence. This finding
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lends support to the conclusion of many authors that railroad
highway grade crossing accidents are predominantly the result
of driver characteristics and/or chance.
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